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Introduction 
The Obama administration’s $900 billion healthcare reform bill was forged against a 
backdrop of intense political and societal debate and acrimonious ideological differences. 
During this process, the input of trade associations such as the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) was discreet but highly influential. Aware of the 
legislation’s long-term implications for the industry, PhRMA worked diligently on behalf of 
its member companies by deeply engaging with the government on the bill’s design and 
implementation and ensuring the interests of its members were represented during the 
proceedings. 
But the role of PhRMA went far beyond simply informing public policy. In fact, 
PhRMA worked strategically to ensure maximum impact on the legislative process. Memos 
released in 2012 by the U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee 
revealed that the Obama administration coordinated a $150 million advertising campaign, 
funded by PhRMA and its members, in support of the 2010 Affordable Care Act.
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 More 
troublingly, an investigation launched by a Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
confirmed that PhRMA was so influential that the Obama White House felt compelled to “cut 
a deal” with PhRMA to promote and ultimately pass the controversial healthcare bill.2 
So why are trade associations interesting and worthy of more attention from 
management and organization researchers? The U.S. healthcare example highlights the 
critical political role that trade associations have assumed in modern economies. Trade 
associations like PhRMA play an ever-increasing role in the policy-making process in many 
countries and have significant influence over regulation and policy. They range in size and 
nature from the niche Fine Chocolate Industry Association with annual corporate 
membership fees of $350, to the U.S. Aerospace Industries Association with 158 full and 219 
associate members paying annual membership dues ranging from $3,000 to $400,000 
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depending on total sales. Despite their differences, they are united in their efforts to serve 
their industries by influencing regulation and government policy, and sometimes public 
opinion, on behalf of the collective needs and objectives of their members.  
In addition to this visible external role, they also serve as agents for disseminating and 
exchanging information within a given industry (Vives, 1990), and often act as informal 
regulators of industry activity by setting voluntary standards of behavior for industry 
members. They also often play an important role in determining the boundary of an industry 
with membership in an industry association acting as an important marker of industry 
membership. As such they are active agents of industry configuration and self-regulation, and 
often act as “the voice of an industry” by unifying disparate companies around a single 
message.  
Yet, despite the obvious influence and importance of trade associations for firms, 
industries and societies more broadly, management and organization researchers have 
devoted surprisingly little attention to understanding them (Reveley & Ville, 2010). We will 
argue here that trade associations are influential organizations that deserve sustained attention 
from anyone interested in the inner workings of industries and in the influence of companies 
on society. We believe management and organization researchers must develop a clear 
understanding their purpose, sources of influence, and impact on companies, industries and 
society more broadly that reflects their unique role and special characteristics.  
More specifically, in this short essay we draw on work from adjacent disciplines such 
as economics and political science, as well as the limited research that has been done in 
management and organization theory on trade associations, to begin to explore their nature 
and role. We then discuss three examples of areas of management research where we believe 
trade associations are of particular relevance and where existing theoretical perspectives 
remain limited without an explicit consideration of these organizations. We close with a 
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general appeal for management researchers to pay more attention to these important and 
influential organizations.  
What is a trade association? 
Unlike trade unions, charities, alliances, terrorist groups, religious associations, 
political parties, business communities or other similar meta-organizations that use similar 
collective practices, there is good reason to believe that trade associations have a unique role 
in modern societies due to the level of resources and expertise at their disposal, as well as the 
special nature of their constituents (Ahrne and Brunsson 2005).  Building on Lyon & 
Maxwell (2004), we define trade associations as multi-member meta-organizations to which 
member companies donate money or pay a membership subscription to sustain the 
association for the greater benefit of the members, the industry, and society more broadly. 
This definition is purposefully broad in order to cover the diversity of trade associations that 
exist, such as the American Car Rental Association, the European Steel Association, 
Canada’s Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, and the Australian Retailers 
Association.  
Boléat (2003) argues that trade associations share three common characteristics. First, 
they are member-based organizations whose members are other organizations (for profit, 
non-profit or non-governmental), not individuals. Second, they exhibit a governance and 
decision-making structure that is representative of their members. Third, they act in the 
common interest of their members. Boléat (1996, 2003) also identifies a fourth characteristic 
that is predominantly seen in larger associations: they act as a representative or collective 
body, engaging with government regulators and policy makers, the media and other opinion 
formers. Boléat’s first three characteristics are commonly observable and generic features of 
trade associations. The fourth may or may not be present as it begins to capture not only 
nature or form, but also activity and influence. While we believe that all trade associations 
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are of interest, it is obviously ones with this latter characteristic that are of particular 
importance. 
What types of trade association exist? 
It is clear that many different kinds of trade associations exist.  But one thing that is 
missing from the literature is an explicit focus on the connection between trade association 
characteristics and their role and impact within their industry and more broadly in society 
(Barnett, Mischke & Ocasio, 2010). Building on Boléat (2003), we observe that different 
types of trade associations develop very different influencing strategies with diverging 
impacts. 
In order to categorize this variation, we focus on two dimensions – size and function – 
to categorize the different types of trade associations that can be observed in different 
industries.  Our trade association matrix (Figure 1) can help scholars to identify different 
functional choices, like design and boundary conditions, and better understand the different 
collective actions available to trade associations.   Therefore, we categorize trade associations 
from small to large in relation to functional features, i.e. internal engagement with members 
and external engagement with socio-political actors.   
 
---Insert Figure 1 here--- 
 
As Figure 1 implies, collective reputation management is one key reason why 
companies form or join a trade association, as it helps to create impact (Tucker, 2008). Figure 
1 allows scholars to explain the usefulness of trust and legitimacy with socio-political actors.  
Streeck & Schmitter (1985) describe it as an attempt to maximize the overlap between the 
specific interests of particular groups such as business lobbies and the broader interests of 
society.  
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In Figure 1 we suggest that due to their large size and associated resource, Fast 
Follower trade associations develop some bargaining roles between private and public 
interests and establish a certain amount of trust, status and reputation through information 
exchange. However, these types of associations tend to focus more on internal industry 
activities such as community building, training and development, and sharing new standards 
and governance knowledge.  Fast Followers engage with public relations and the media 
(although less frequently than Powerhouses) and they place less emphasis on leveraging 
research outputs to lobby political actors. They may lag behind their Powerhouse peers in 
terms of public profile and policy access but they follow fast and engage swiftly on any 
issues or initiatives that emerge in the public domain.      
Powerhouse trade associations, as the name implies, are large, heavily resourced 
organizations that arbitrate between private and public interests and create significant trust, 
status and reputation through robust and reliable information exchanges. Inherently, these 
types of associations develop close relationships with governmental or regulatory authorities 
and have significant levels of policy input (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985). They are typically 
the “go-to” associations for government and policy makers seeking a collective input and a 
representative voice of industry.  
The trade associations that we classify as Orators tend to be small in size and focus 
mainly on communicating effectively with their members. They place much less emphasis on 
engaging directly and frequently with political and regulatory agents or society at large.  
Orators tend to be driven by their members’ needs and interests and focus mainly on online 
engagement, event management and intra industry co-ordination.  These trade associations 
usually have low budgets, minimal staffing and low external impact in terms of trust and 
reputation.  Internal to the association, they are effective at speaking directly to the objectives 
and intent of members.  
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This contrasts with the trade associations that we label Campaigners, which focus 
largely on external campaigning and communication.  The agendas of Campaigners tend to 
be driven by member demands and expectations but they usually have a small central 
administrative team that may take independent decisions, particularly on tactical matters.  
Campaigner trade associations tend to be small and lack resources to influence policy 
makers.  They occasionally leverage research findings and outputs to advocate on behalf of 
members but tend to focus on communication rather than explicit lobbying. In this way, they 
can achieve some policy and public opinion impact and create a certain amount of trust and 
reputation through the use of reliable evidence and data.   
Industry associations as a research area in strategic organization 
Our discussion so far has focused on why trade associations are interesting and 
important organizational forms and has emphasized the need for more research focus from 
management scholars. In this section, we advance three examples of areas of research where 
we believe industry associations are of particular importance. We are not, of course, 
suggesting that there are not other important areas of research such as co-opetition, business 
groups and community building amongst rival organizations (Gulati, Puranam and Tushman 
2012), but we provide these as specific examples of the sort of engagement with the topic of 
trade associations that we hope this essay will initiate. 
Institutional theory and industry associations  
From an institutional perspective, trade associations are an important and 
understudied form of institutional entrepreneur (Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004). These 
institutional entrepreneurs carry out extensive institutional work (Lawrence, Suddany & 
Leca, 2011) both within their organizational field and between their field and the broader 
societal context. They are also an important convener of field configuring events (Anand & 
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Jones, 2008) that lead to the rapid development of the field. Both externally and internally, 
the over-riding purpose of trade organizations is to attempt to change the “rules of the game” 
in the collective’s favor (DiMaggio, 1988) and they are therefore an important phenomenon 
for institutional researchers.  
Internally, these institutional entrepreneurs play a key role in the structuration of the 
field. They are a form of industry collective action through which the industry manages the 
self-regulation that can act to shape the field in important ways (King & Lenox, 2000; 
Lawton & McGuire, 2003). For example, Tucker (2008) notes that trade associations often 
have a self-regulatory function, embodying shared values, articulating common norms and 
coalescing around common interests such as lighter regulation, easier market access or more 
positive media coverage. Yet, there has been almost no consideration of how trade 
associations function in the structuration of fields and this important mechanism remains 
largely unstudied. 
Externally, we can extend Barley’s (2010) argument that corporations systematically 
build an institutional field to exert greater influence on government and see trade associations 
as proxies that fulfill this need. As Barley notes, the construction of what he terms “an 
institutional field to corral government” (2010: 777) serves to build and channel collective 
corporate political influence, while at the same time deflecting accusations of corporations 
directly influencing government. Similarly, trade associations can, in specific industry 
contexts, influence the institutional field to affect government decisions and actions. Also, 
trade associations leverage their influence on institutional field formation to affect the 
perceived collective reputation of their members (Tucker, 2008). Intended outcomes include 
favorable rules and norms on tax, employment practices, environmental impact, and research 
and development subsidies (Lawrence, 1999). Again, while this is obviously a very important 
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institutional mechanism we have little research and theorizing to understand the important 
role of these organizations at the interface of institutional fields and societies more broadly. 
Collective identity and industry associations 
Another related area where the role and functions of trade associations has obvious 
relevance is around the notion of a collective identity. Scholars have defined collective 
identities “as groups of actors … organized around a shared purpose and similar outputs” 
(Wry, Lounsbury and Glynn, 2011: 449). These identities are socially constructed and 
negotiated on an ongoing basis (Patvardhan, Goia and Hamilton, 2014). A collective identity 
emerges when a set of organizations become understood as being organizations of the same 
kind in the sense that they do the same thing and share important characteristics. Examples 
include industrial versus craft brewers (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000), classical versus 
nouvelle cuisine chefs (Rao et al. 2003), and Boston trustees versus New York money 
managers (Lounsbury 2007).  
Trade associations have an obvious relevance to these discussions. While collective 
identities emerge through complex social processes, industry associations can play a central 
role in these processes by negotiating definitions that both reflect understandings but also 
stabilize and solidify them. Their role as guardians of the interests of members of an industry 
requires an understanding of what a member is and therefore a formalization of the collective 
identity. Their role in industry self-governance is also a further attempt to formalize and 
define what is legitimate activity for a member of the organization and what organizational 
members must do. All in all, trade associations are at the heart of the development of 
collective identities in many industries yet they have received surprisingly little attention 
from scholars in this area.  
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Nonmarket strategy and industry associations 
The third area of research where we believe industry associations can be important is 
nonmarket strategy, where trade organizations are recognized as social and political actors, 
not just economic agents (Bach and Allen 2010; Lawton et al., 2014). Scholars investigating 
business lobbying should look in more detail at trade associations, especially those in highly 
regulated industries where there is greater incentive to participate in political action. 
Investigating trade association responses to defend against new entrants, or opposition to new 
or potential regulations, can enable an understanding of nonmarket competition between 
different interest groups.   
Also, using a resource-based view, political resources matter in trade associations, as 
nonmarket strategy is likely to produce little payoff unless there are tangible policy outcomes 
for member firms (Lawton, Doh and Rajwani 2014). We find that larger trade associations 
take a long-term orientation of their nonmarket strategy as they encounter higher co-
ordination costs and must therefore adopt a more sustained approach to responsible lobbying. 
Using political networks, they reduce uncertainties and costs establishing ongoing ties with 
government and regulatory agencies to capture information about intended or forthcoming 
public policy that may impact on their member firms strategic objectives or outcomes.  
Building on nonmarket strategy research (Baron 1995; Doh, Lawton and Rajwani 
2012), we argue that future research on political networks should consider relationships, 
targets and levels used by trade associations. In particular, the interpersonal rewards that 
attach to ongoing participation in specific issues at different institutional levels (regional, 
national and international) with key political actors. The targets and intensity of these 
relationships can be instructive in explaining trade association effectiveness. In general, this 
approach rests on the argument that trade associations are embedded within political and 
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social networks, and more or less formal political and social structures, all of which are likely 
to influence decisions to engage in collective action.  
Concluding thoughts 
In an influential and thought-provoking article, Stern and Barley (1996: 148) argue 
that while the importance of organizations in society has increased dramatically over time, 
the interest in the societal impact of organizations among management and organization 
scholars has ironically declined: 
[T]he sociologically crucial point is that organizations have not only become 
prominent actors in society, they may have become the only kind of actor with 
significant cultural and political influence. Yet recent organizational theory 
has surprisingly little to say about how organizations affect the society. 
While we agree wholeheartedly with this sentiment, we would go further and argue that trade 
associations are one of these prominent actors writ large. They therefore deserve much more 
attention from management and organization researchers and we hope our fellow researchers 
will take on the task. 
In order to highlight this point, we have argued that trade associations are critically 
important organizations that work at the interface of society and industry. On the positive 
side, they enable the construction of mutually beneficial public-private policy partnerships 
and the development of more effective self-regulatory regimes (Schaefer & Kerrigan, 2008). 
But these associations also command huge influence in policy making processes through 
lobbying and the allocation of resources as well as playing a central role in the development 
and maintenance of industries where they perform critically important functions including 
coordination, information exchange and the management of industry membership. Our 
intention here is to contribute to an increased awareness of the theoretical and practical 
importance of trade associations and a heightened interest among management researchers in 
exploring their functioning and effect. We hope we have succeeded.  
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